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1. Introduction
In	this	paper	I	defend	what	I	frankly	admit	may	appear	on	first	inspec-
tion	to	be	a	preposterous	position.	I	say	it	may	appear	“preposterous”	
advisedly,	because	every	philosopher	I	have	discussed	it	with	has	ear-
nestly assured me it is preposterous — until, that is, the argument has 
been	explained,	whereupon	much	chin	rubbing	and	head	scratching	
ensues.	If	the	argument	has	a	weakness,	then	it	is,	I	think,	not	obvious	
where	it	is.
The	position	concerns	the	three	great	modal	dichotomies:
The metaphysical dichotomy. A true statement is necessary	iff	
it	is	impossible	for	it	to	be	false.	Otherwise	it	is	contingent.1
The epistemic dichotomy. A true statement is a priori	iff	it	can	
be	known	 independently	of	 experience.	Otherwise	 it	 is	
empirical (or a posteriori).
The semantic dichotomy. A true statement is analytic	iff	it	is	
true	in	virtue	of	meaning	alone.	Otherwise	it	is	synthetic.2
1.	 By	a	‘statement’	I	mean	a	sentence	produced	in	a	context.	Here	I	focus	only	on	
true	statements.	If	both	true	and	false	statements	are	considered,	then	we	get	
not	a	dichotomy	but	a	trichotomy	—	between	necessary truths, necessary false-
hoods and contingencies.	The	 same	goes,	mutatis mutandis,	 for	 the	epistemic	
and	semantic	dichotomies.	
2.	 It	 is	 presently	 something	of	 a	 received	view:	 (i)	 that	 the	necessary/contin-
gent and a priori/empirical	dichotomies	apply	in	the	first	instance	to proposi-
tions;	 (ii)	 that	 these	 two	dichotomies	 also	 apply	derivatively	 to	 statements	
that	express	propositions,	with	a	statement	inheriting	the	metaphysical	and	
epistemic	statuses	of	the	proposition	it	expresses;	but	(iii)	that	the	analytic/
synthetic	dichotomy	instead	applies	only to statements, not to the propositions 
they	express.	I	won’t	challenge	this	received	view	in	the	present	paper.	Ac-
cordingly,	 I	will	work	 always	 at	 the	 level	 of	 statements,	 not	 that	 of	 propo-
sitions.	 However,	 I	 will	 argue	 elsewhere	 that	 the	 received	 view	 is	 poorly	
motivated and that there are strong reasons for thinking that all three modal 
dichotomies	 apply	 in	 the	first	 instance	 to propositions.	 It	 is	 also	 sometimes	
suggested	that	the	analytic/synthetic	dichotomy	applies	to	sentences.	This	is	
implausible,	 since	 statements	have	determinate	meanings	while	 sentences	
(often)	don’t	(Hospers,	1967,	163).	For	example,	an	utterance	of	the	sentence	
‘Banks	 are	monetary	 institutions’	might	 be	 either	 an	 analytically	 true	 state-
ment	or	a	synthetic	falsehood,	depending	on	whether	the	context	is	indicative	
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A	modal	category	“has	members”	if	statements	belonging	in	that	cat-
egory	exist.	 It	 is	 “empty”	 if	 there	are	no	statements	of	 that	 type.	For	
example,	NAA	has	members	iff	there	is	at	least	one	statement	that	is	
necessary,	a priori	and	analytic.	On	the	plausible	assumption	that	(1)	is	
such	a	statement,	NAA	does	indeed	have	members:
(1)	 All	bachelors	are	unmarried.
The	position	I	will	defend	is	this:
Octopropositionalism:	 All	 eight	 modal	 categories	 have	
members.	None	is	empty.
Octopropositionalism	appears	preposterous	because	it	flies	in	the	face	
of	received	opinion	going	right	back	to	Hume.	Hume	famously	held	
that there are just two types of statements, relations of ideas and mat-
ters of fact.	The	former	are	(in	my	terminology)	NAA	statements,	being	
necessary,	a priori	and	analytic.	An	example	is	(1).	The	latter	are	CES	
statements,	 being	 contingent,	 empirical	 and	 synthetic.	 An	 example	 
is	(2):
(2)	The	sun	will	rise	tomorrow.
The	doctrine	that	only	these	two	types	of	statements	exist	 is	Hume’s 
fork.	Octopropositionalism	lies	at	one	extremity	of	a	spectrum	that	has	
Hume’s	fork	at	the	other	extremity.3	For	Hume,	the	three	modal	dichot-
omies	 are	 co-extensive	 and	 collapse	 into	 a	 single	 dichotomy	—	that	
between	 relations	 of	 ideas	 and	matters	 of	 fact.	 For	 the	 octoproposi-
tionalist,	in	contrast,	the	three	modal	dichotomies	are	maximally	non-
coextensive.	They	come	apart	every which way.
3.	 The	Quinean	position	that	all	three	modal	dichotomies	are	ill-posed	lies	at	
the	extremity	of	a	different	spectrum.	For	recent	rebuttals	of	Quine,	and	of	
related	arguments	by	Harman	 (1973,	 1996),	 see	 (Juhl	&	Loomis,	2010),	 (G.	
Russell,	2008)	and	(Chalmers,	2012).
These	three	dichotomies	can	be	combined	to	produce	the	tri-dichoto-
my	of	Figure	1:
Figure 1. The	modal	tri-dichotomy.
Figure	1	depicts	eight	modal	categories:
NAA:	Necessary,	A priori and Analytic
NAS:	Necessary,	A priori and Synthetic
NEA:	Necessary,	Empirical	and	Analytic
NES:	Necessary,	Empirical	and	Synthetic
CAA:	Contingent, A priori and Analytic
CAS:	Contingent, A priori and Synthetic
CEA:	Contingent, Empirical	and	Analytic
CES:	Contingent, Empirical	and	Synthetic
of	Main	Street	or	a	river’s	edge.	The	sentence	itself	 is	 thus	neither	analytic	
nor	synthetic.
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Kaplan	(1977,	509,	540)	has	also	argued	that	(7)	is	a priori,	contingent	
and	analytic,	making	it	a	CAA	statement:
(7)	I	am	here	now.
Pulling	these	ideas	together,	we	obtain	the	following	candidate	mem-
bers	of	the	different	modal	categories:
NAA:	Hume’s	(1)
NAS:	Kant’s	(4)
NEA:	-----------}	Kripke’s	(5)	goes	in	one
NES:		-----------}	of	these	two	places
CAA:	Kaplan’s	(7),	-----------}	Kripke’s	(6)	goes	in	one
CAS:	Descartes’	(3),		--------}	of	these	two	places
CEA:
CES:	Hume’s	(2)
This	list	comes	nowhere	close	to	vindicating	octopropositionalism.	In	
the	first	place,	neither	Descartes,	Kant,	Kripke	nor	Kaplan	provides	us	
with	a	putative	example	of	a	CEA	statement.	Second,	if	Kripke	is	right,	
then	(5)	is	a	member	either	of	NEA	or	of	NES,	but	it	can’t	be	a	member	
of	both	—	which	leaves	one	of	these	two	sectors	vacant.	Third,	it	is	not	
obvious	the	ideas	of	Descartes,	Kant,	Kripke	and	Kaplan	can	or	should	
all	be	accepted	conjointly	—	potentially	 leaving	one	or	more	of	NAS,	
CAA	or	CAS	empty.	
In	short,	although	these	philosophers	have	produced	reasons	 for	
thinking	 statements	 are	more	modally	 diverse	 than	Hume’s	 fork	 al-
lows,	none	of	them	has	challenged	a	weaker	Humean	doctrine	to	the	
effect	 that some modal categories are empty.	 The	 octopropositionalist	
must	refute	even	this	weaker	doctrine,	which,	in	view	of	how	well	it	
has	stood	the	test	of	time	down	the	centuries,	would	appear	a	very	tall	
order	indeed.	
Setting	 aside	 the	 apparent	 unlikelihood	 of	 octopropositional-
ism’s	being shown to be true, why, if it were true, would its truth mat-
ter?	 Its	 truth	would	be	 important	 for	 the	same	reasons	 that	Kripke’s	
In arguing for his ‟fork”,	Hume	(the	arch	empiricist)	was	partly	mo-
tivated	by	a	wish	to	deny	that	Descartes	(the	arch	rationalist)	was	cor-
rect	in	claiming	that	(3)	is	a priori:
(3)	A	thinking	thing	exists.
If	Descartes	were right	about	(3)	being	a priori,	then,	since	(3)	is	contin-
gent	and	synthetic,	it	would	be	a	CAS	statement.4	This	Hume	took	to	
be	impossible.5
Kant	 argued,	 contra	Hume,	 that	 statements	 of	 a	 third	 type	 exist:	
namely,	NAS	 statements	 that	 are	 necessary	 and	 a priori on the one 
hand	but	synthetic	on	the	other.	(4)	is	an	example.
(4)	Causation	exists.
In	more	recent	times,	Kripke	(1980)	produced	examples	both	of	state-
ments	that	are	necessary	but	empirical	—	e.	g.,	(5)	—	and	of	statements	
that	are	contingent	but	a priori	—	e.	g.,	(6).	The	former	are	members	of	
either	NEA	or	NES,	depending	on	whether	they	are	classified	as	ana-
lytic	or	synthetic.	The	latter	are	members	of	either	CAA	or	CAS.
(5)	Water	is	H
2
O.
(6)	 The	 Standard	 Meter	 Bar	 is	 one	 meter	 long,	 if	  
anything	is.6
4.	 See	(Hintikka,	1962;	1963),	(Kitcher,	1983,	30)	and	(Burge	1988)	for	rational	
reconstructions	of	the	cogito	argument	that	shed	light	on	how	(3)	might	ac-
quire	a	CAS	status.
5.	 For	Hume,	 (3)	 is	 instead	known	empirically,	via	 introspection,	making	 it	 a	
CES	statement.
6.	 I	add	an	‘if	anything	is’	clause	to	cover	reference-failure	that	Kripke	doesn’t	
include,	although	see	(Kripke,	1980,	110).	Evans’	 (1982,	31)	 ‘Julius	 invented	
the	zip’	example	would	serve	just	as	well	as	(6),	as	would	similar	examples	
due	to	Swinburne	(1975,	234,	243).
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for	 constructing	members	of	 the	 remaining	categories.	 §3	 considers	
the	proper	 framing	of	 the	analytic/synthetic	distinction.	§4	presents	
the	case	for	thinking	NAS	statements	exist.	§5	and	§6	do	likewise	for	
NEA	and	CAA	statements.	§7	wraps	things	up.
2. Conjunction and disjunction
My	 argument	 for	 octopropositionalism	 hinges	 on	 the	 following	
‟trumping	rules”,	which	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge	have	heretofore	
gone	unnoticed	in	the	literature	on	the	three	modal	dichotomies:8
The conjunctive rules
T1.	 In	a	conjunction	of	 two	truths,	p and q,	contingency	
trumps	necessity,	in	the	sense	that	if	either	p or q	is	con-
tingent,	then	‘p∧q’	is	contingent	too.
T2.	In	a	conjunction	of	two	truths,	p and q,	empiricalness	
trumps apriority, in the sense that if either p or q is empiri-
cal,	then	‘p∧q’	is	empirical	too.
T3.	 In	a	 conjunction	of	 two	 truths,	p and q,	 syntheticity	
trumps	analyticity,	in	the	sense	that	if	either	p or q is syn-
thetic,	then	‘p∧q’	is	synthetic	too.
The disjunctive rules
T4.	In	a	disjunction,	necessity	trumps	contingency,	in	the	
sense that if either p or q	is	necessary,	then	‘p∨q’	is	neces-
sary	too.
T5.	In	a	disjunction,	apriority	trumps	empiricalness,	in	the	
sense that if either p or q is a priori,	then	‘p∨q’	is	a priori	too.
8.	 For	example,	they	are	not	discussed	by	(Swinburne,	1975),	(G.	Russell,	2008)	
or	(Juhl	&	Loomis,	2010).	
discoveries	about	statements	like	(5)	and	(6)	have	been	important.	In	
demonstrating	that	empirical	necessities	and	a priori	contingencies	are	
possible,	Kripke	showed	the	danger	in	the	common	practice	of	treat-
ing	 apriority	 as	 a	 reliable	 guide	 to	necessity	 and	vice versa.	 If	 octop-
ropositionalism	were	correct,	then	the	same	lesson	would	apply	with	
absolute	generality:	no modal attribute of a statement would be a reli-
able guide to any other.	This	wouldn’t	entirely	debar	us	from	appealing	
to	heuristics	such	as	‘if	a	statement	is	synthetic,	then	it	is	empirical’	or	
‘if	a	statement	is	necessary,	then	it	is	analytic’.	But	it	would	mean	that	
such	heuristics	would	need	always	 to	be	 treated	with	caution	and	a	
careful	eye	to	known	classes	of	counterexamples.	
The	truth	of	octopropositionalism	would	also	have	major	implica-
tions with regards to the proper understanding of entailment.	 Three	
species	of	entailment	can	be	distinguished,	as	follows:7
ϕ	metaphysically	entails	ψ	iff	ϕ⊃ψ	is	necessary.
ϕ	epistemically	entails	ψ	iff	ϕ⊃ψ	is	a	priori.
ϕ	semantically	entails	ψ	iff	ϕ⊃ψ	is	analytic.
Because	octopropositionalism	 implies	 that	 none	of	 the	 three	modal	
dichotomies	is	a	reliable	guide	to	any	other,	it	also	implies	that	none	of	
these	three	species	of	entailment	is	a	reliable	guide	to	any	other.	For	in-
stance,	if	ϕ⊃ψ	were	empirical	but	analytic,	then	ϕ	would	semantically	
entail	ψ	without	epistemically	entailing	it.	Or	if	ϕ⊃ψ	were	necessary	
but	synthetic,	then	ϕ	would	metaphysically	entail	ψ	without	semanti-
cally	entailing	it.	And	so	on,	for	every	pairing	of	the	different	species	
of	entailment.	Octopropositionalism	therefore	has	the	upshot	that	the	
three	entailment	relations	are	completely	separable	and	distinct.
Overview.	§2	explains	the	strategy	I	use	to	argue	for	octoproposition-
alism	—	a	strategy	which	involves	showing	that	NAS,	NEA	and		CAA	
statements	exist,	and	then	using	these	statements	as	"raw	ingredients”	
7.	 I	owe	this	point	in	part	to	(Pollock,	1974,	300).
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Table	2	does	the	same	for	disjunctions	(with	the	operative	trumping	
rules	being	T4,	T5	and	T6):
Table 2. How	the	modal	categories	of	p and q determine the mod-
al	category	of	p∨q.
Tables	1	and	2	have	been	constructed	by	simply	applying	the	relevant	
trumping	rules	to	each	pair	of	‟parent”	statements,	in	order	to	deduce	
the	modal	status	of	the	“child”	statement.
Most entries in these tables are (relatively) uninteresting for one or 
both	of	these	reasons:
(a)	The	“child”	statement	obtained	by	conjoining	or	dis-
joining p with q	belongs	to	the	same	modal	category	as	
either p or q.	For	instance,	conjoining	an	NAS	statement	
with	an	NES	statement	merely	yields	another	NES	state-
ment,	getting	us	nowhere.
(b)	The	“child”	statement	is	a	Humean	NAA	or	CES	state-
ment,	 of	 which	 bountiful	 uncontroversial	 examples	 al-
ready	exist.
Entries	in	Table	1	which	are	not	“uninteresting”	for	either	of	these	rea-
sons	are	indicated	in	bold.	There	are	only	three	of	them,	and	they	say	
the	following:
T6.	 In	 a	 disjunction,	 analyticity	 trumps	 syntheticity,	 in	
the sense that if either p or q	 is	 analytic,	 then	 ‘p∨q’	 is	  
analytic	too.9
For	example,	let	p	be	any	contingent	truth.	Since	p	is	contingent,	it	is	
possible for p	 to	be	false.	Thus,	it	 is	possible	for	p∧q to be false, irre-
spective	of	whether	q	is	necessary	or	contingent	(p∧q being false if p 
is).	And	so,	p’s	status	as	a	contingent	truth	is	inherited	by	p∧q.	In	short,	
contingency	 trumps	 necessity	 within	 conjunctions,	 which	 is	 what	 
T1	says.
T2–T6	are	easily	confirmed	using	similar	examples.
Table	1	shows,	for	any	pair	of	truths,	p and q,	how	the	modal	cat-
egory that p∧q	belongs	to	is	determined	by	which	categories	p and q 
belong	to.	The	operative	trumping	rules	are	T1,	T2	and	T3.
Table 1.	How	the	modal	categories	of	p and q determine the mod-
al	category	of	p∧q.
9.	 The	 conjunctive	 rules	 contain	a	 clause,	 ‘of	 two	 truths’,	 that	 the	disjunctive	
rules	lack.	The	clause	is	included	in	order	to	exclude	certain	problematic	cas-
es	(e.	g.,	as	when	q=¬p)	from	the	scope	of	the	conjunctive	rules.	
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Recipe 1.	 Start	 with	 “raw	 ingredients”	 consisting	 of:	 (i)	 any	 NAS	
statement;	(ii)	any	NEA	statement;	and	(iii)	any	CAA	statement.	Then	
construct	a	‟full	house”	as	follows:
NAA:	NAS∨NEA	(by	Rule	10)
NAS:	-raw	ingredient-
NEA:	-raw	ingredient-
NES:	NAS∧NEA	(by	Rule	1)
CAA:	-raw	ingredient-
CAS:	NAS∧CAA	(by	Rule	2)
CEA:	NEA∧CAA	(by	Rule	3)
CES:	NAS∧NEA∧CAA	(by	Rule	4)
Recipe 2. Start	with	"raw	ingredients”	consisting	of:	(i)	any	NES	state-
ment;	(ii)	any	CAS	statement;	and	(iii)	any	CEA	statement.	Then	con-
struct	a	“full	house”	as	follows:
NAA:	NES∨CAS∨CEA	(by	Rule	9)
NAS:	NES∨CAS	(by	Rule	6)
NEA:	NES∨CEA	(by	Rule	7)
NES:	-raw	ingredient-
CAA:	CAS∨CEA	(by	Rule	8)
CAS:	-raw	ingredient-
Rule	1:	NAS∧NEA=NES
Rule	2:	NAS∧CAA=CAS
Rule	3:	NEA∧CAA=CEA
Table	1	also	implies	the	following	pair	of	rules	for	creating	CES	state-
ments	(both	of	which	turn	out	to	be	marginally	useful):
Rule	4:	NAS∧NEA∧CAA=CES
Rule	5:	NES∧CAS=CES
There	are	likewise	three	“interesting”	entries	 in	Table	2,	 indicated	in	
bold,	which	say:
Rule	6:	NES∨CAS=NAS
Rule	7:	NES∨CEA=NEA
Rule	8:	CAS∨CEA=CAA
Table	2	also	gives	us	these	two	rules	for	creating	NAA	statements:
Rule	9:	NES∨CAS∨CEA=NAA
Rule	10:	NAS∨NEA=NAA
Putting	all	 these	 rules	 together,	we	obtain	 two	 “recipes”	by	which	a	
“full	house”	of	all	 eight	 types	of	 statements	can	be	constructed	 from	
only	three	“raw	ingredients”.
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necessary	 to	show	that	condition	C2	obtains,	which	would	(in	part)	
require	demonstrating	the	existence	of	some	CEA	statement.	As	noted	
in	§1,	however,	plausible	examples	of	CEA	statements	are	decidedly	
thin	on	the	ground.	For	this	reason,	Recipe	2	is	unlikely	to	be	viable.	
Recipe	1	 (which	uses	Rule	3	 to	construct	CEA	statements	 from	NEA	
and	CAA	ingredients)	will	therefore	be	the	focus	from	now	on.
On	 the	assumption	 that	 (4),	 (5)	 and	 (7)	 are	NAS,	NEA	and	CAA	
statements,	respectively,	Recipe	1	enables	all	eight	modal	categories	to	
be	filled	as	follows:11
NAA:	Causation	exists,	or	water	is	H
2
O.
NAS:	Causation	exists.
NEA:	Water	is	H
2
O.
NES:	Causation	exists,	and	water	is	H
2
O.
CAA:	I	am	here	now.
CAS:	Causation	exists,	and	I	am	here	now.
CEA:	Water	is	H
2
O,	and	I	am	here	now.
CES:	 Causation	 exists,	 and	 water	 is	 H
2
O,	 and	 I	 am	  
here	now.
For	the	reader	who	is	happy	to	accept	that	(4),	(5)	and	(7)	are	indeed	
NAS,	NEA	and	CAA	statements,	that	completes	my	argument	for	oc-
topropositionalism.	But	 for	readers	sceptical	 that	(4),	 (5)	and	(7)	are	
correctly	so-pigeonholed	(probably,	most	readers),	I	need	to	say	more	
by	way	of	showing	that	each	of	Recipe	1’s	raw	ingredients	is	obtainable.	
11.	 Here	I	use	(7),	rather	than	(6),	as	a	CAA	statement.	The	choice	is	arbitrary.
CEA:	-raw	ingredient-
CES:	NES∧CAS	(by	Rule	5)10
Let	conditions	C1	and	C2	be	defined	as	follows:
C1:	NAS,	NEA	and	CAA	statements	exist.
C2:	NES,	CAS	and	CEA	statements	exist.
If	C1	obtains,	then	all	eight	modal	categories	can	be	filled	using	Recipe	
1,	so	octopropositionalism	is	true.	Likewise,	if	C2	obtains,	then	all	eight	
categories	can	be	filled	using	Recipe	2,	so	octopropositionalism	is	true.	
Hence	octopropositionalism	can	be	defended	either by showing that 
C1	obtains	or	by	showing	that	C2	obtains.	Whoever	denies	octopropo-
sitionalism must deny both	that	C1	obtains	and	that	C2	obtains.
Notice	 the	 dramatic	 shift	 in	 burdens	 of	 proof	 that	 has	 just	 been	
achieved.	 It	 might	 have	 been	 thought	 that	 an	 octopropositionalist	
must	argue	independently	for	the	existence	of	each	of	the	eight	differ-
ent	types	of	statement.	This	would	provide	her	opponent	with	eight	
independent	lines	of	possible	resistance.	But	it	has	just	been	shown	
that	 in	 practice	 the	 octopropositionalist	 only	 needs	 to	 demonstrate	
that three	 categories	 of	 statements	 exist,	 for	 she	 can	 then	use	 these	
three	to	construct	the	other	five.	Moreover	she	even	has	a	choice	as	to	
which	three	raw	ingredients	to	start	with:	NAS,	NEA	and	CAA,	if	she	
uses	Recipe	1,	or	NES,	CAS	and	CEA,	if	she	uses	Recipe	2.	
That’s	 the	good	news	 for	 the	octopropositionalist.	The	bad	news	
is	 that	one	of	 these	 two	ways	of	proceeding	 can	be	almost	 immedi-
ately	discounted.	In	order	to	be	able	to	use	Recipe	2,	it	would	first	be	
10.	 In	 practice	 it	 is	 obviously	 not	 necessary	 to	 construct	NAA	 and	CES	 state-
ments	using	the	methods	contained	in	Recipes	1	and	2,	since	uncontroversial	
examples	of	such	statements	are	easily	found,	such	as	(1)	and	(2).	The	rules	
used	to	construct	these	statements	—	namely,	Rules	4,	5,	9	and	10	—	are	there-
fore	of	much	less	interest	and	importance	than	the	remaining	rules	—	Rules	1,	
2,	3,	6,	7	and	8.
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analyticity,	making	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	true	(and	octopropo-
sitionalism	false)	by	brute	definitional	fiat.13
Importantly, Kant did not	argue	for	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	or	
Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	by	proposing	a	trivializing	definition	of	
analyticity.	 In	defining	analyticity,	he	 focused	specifically	on	affirma-
tive	predicate-subject	statements	of	the	form	R(s).	In	his	words,	‟Ana-
lytic	judgments	say	nothing	in	the	predicate	except	what	was	actually	
thought	already	 in	 the	concept	of	 the	subject,	 though	not	so	clearly	
nor	with	the	same	consciousness”	(2004,	16).	That	is,	R(s)	is	analytic	
for	Kant	iff	R	is	contained	in	the	concept	of	s.	This	characterization	of	
analyticity	doesn’t	make	it	true	by definition	that	analytic	statements	are	
necessary	and/or	a priori.	And	so,	at	least	for	Kant,	Analyticity	Entails	
Apriority	and	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	do	not	themselves qualify as 
analytic	 judgements.	 (One	 can’t	 discover	 that	 an	 analytic	 statement	
must	be	necessary	or	that	it	must	be	a priori	just	by	unpacking	Kant’s	
definition	of	‘analytic’.)
Why	 then	does	Kant	 think	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	 and	Ana-
lyticity	Entails	Necessity	are	true,	if	not	because	they	are	analytically	
true?	In	arguing	for	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority,	he	writes,	‟[I]t would 
be	absurd	to	ground	an	analytic	judgment	on	experience,	since	I	do	
not	 need	 to	 go	beyond	my	 concept	 at	 all	 in	 order	 to	 formulate	 the	
judgment,	and	therefore	need	no	testimony	from	experience	for	that”	
(1998,	B11).	Here	he	is	making	the	following	tacit	assumption:
K1.	 The	 meaning	 (and	 thus	 the	 full	 truth-conditional	
import)	 of	 a	 concept,	 or	 of	 a	 thought,	 is	 accessible	 to	  
a priori reflection.
If R(s)	is	analytic,	then	K1	implies	that	a priori reflection	will	be	able	to	
detect	that	this	is	so	(i.	e.,	a priori	reflection	will	be	able	to	detect	that	
the	predicate,	R,	is	contained	in	the	idea	of	the	subject,	s),	from	which	
it follows that a priori	reflection	will	be	able	to	determine	that	R(s) is 
13.	 See	(Casullo,	1992)	for	a	critique	of	other	trivializing	definitions	of	analyticity,	
as	given	by	Quinton	(1963)	and	Swinburne	(1975).	
To	do	this	I	will	begin	by	arguing	for	a	certain	position	regarding	the	
proper	framing	of	the	analytic/synthetic	distinction.	
3. On the analytic/synthetic distinction
The	analytic/synthetic	distinction	was	coined	by	Kant,	who	took	the	
following	pair	of	doctrines	to	be	true:
Analyticity Entails Apriority:	 All	 analytic	 statements	 are	  
a priori.
Analyticity Entails Necessity:	 All	 analytic	 statements	  
are	necessary.
If	either	of	these	doctrines	is	indeed	true,	then	octopropositionalism	
is	false	(for	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	implies	that	neither	NEA	nor	
CEA	statements	exist,	while	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	implies	that	
neither	CAA	nor	CEA	statements	exist).	One	way	of	arguing	for	An-
alyticity	Entails	Apriority	or	 for	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity,	 and	of	
thereby arguing against	octopropositionalism,	would	be	by	adopting	
what	I	will	call	a	trivializing definition	of	analyticity.	By	this	I	mean	a	def-
inition	which	builds	the	notion	of	apriority	and/or	of	necessity directly 
into the notion of analyticity,	 thereby,	 in	effect,	making	 it	analytic	 that	
octopropositionalism	 is	 false.	For	example,	Kripke	provides	a	 trivial-
izing	definition	when	he	writes:12
[L]et’s	 make	 it	 a	 matter	 of	 stipulation	 that	 an	 analytic	
statement is, in some sense, true by virtue of its meanings 
and true in all possible words by virtue of its meaning.	(Kripke,	
1980,	39,	my	italics.)
This	is	a	trivializing	definition	because	it	builds	the	notion	of	necessity	
(i.	e.,	of	being	true	 in	all	possible	worlds)	directly	 into	 the	notion	of	
12.	 Kripke	later	acknowledges	that	analyticity	might	instead	be	defined	in	a	way	
that	 enables	 certain	 contingent	 statements,	 like	 (6),	 to	 count	 as	 ‟analytic”	
(1980,	122n).
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AnSyn1:	A	statement	is	"analytic”	iff	it	is	true	in	virtue	of	
meaning	alone.	Otherwise	it	is	"synthetic”.
AnSyn1	is	imprecise.	Three	ambiguities	that	need	resolving	are	these:
1.	AnSyn1	mentions	a	statement’s	being	‟true”	in	virtue	of	meaning	
alone.	But	is	the	truth-value	in	question	the	statement’s	truth-value	in	
the actual world	(the	world	we	inhabit	and	experience)	or	its	truth-val-
ue at all possible worlds?14	Depending	on	the	answer,	AnSyn1	unpacks	
into	either	AnSyn2	or	AnSyn3:
AnSyn2:	A	statement	is	"analytic”	 iff	it	 is	actually	true	in	
virtue	of	meaning	alone.	Otherwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
AnSyn3:	A	statement	is	“analytic”	iff	it	is	necessarily	true	
(i.	e.,	 true	 in	 all	 possible	 worlds)	 in	 virtue	 of	 meaning	
alone.	Otherwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
Notice	that	AnSyn3	is	a	trivializing	definition,	for	it	defines	analyticity	
as	 a	 subspecies	 of	 necessity.	 If	 Kant	 had	 intended	 the	 analytic/syn-
thetic	 distinction	 to	be	understood	 along	 the	 lines	of	AnSyn3,	 then	
he	wouldn’t	have	needed	to	rely	on	K1	and	K2	in	order	to	argue	for	
Analyticity	Entails	Necessity.	This	being	so,	we	must	endorse	AnSyn2,	
not	 AnSyn3,	 if	 we	 are	 to	 honor	 Kant’s	 usage	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘analytic’	 
and	‘synthetic’.	
2.	Kripke’s	and	Putnam’s	examples	are	sometimes	taken	as	showing	
that	there	are	two	kinds	of	meaning	associated	with	a	statement,	these	
being:	(i)	a	narrow meaning	that	is	fully	accessible	to	a priori	reflection	
but	which	 sometimes	 falls	 short	 of	 determining	 a	 statement’s	 truth-
value at a possible world; and (ii) a wide meaning that is sometimes 
inaccessible	to	a priori	reflection,	but	which	is	fully	capable,	all	by	itself,	
of	determining	a	statement’s	 truth-value	at	a	possible	world	(Brown,	
2016).	AnSyn2	(like	AnSyn1,	from	which	it	is	descended)	mentions	the	
‟meaning”	associated	with	a	statement,	but	without	specifying	which	
14.	 G.	Russell	(2008,	41,	52–57)	notes	the	same	ambiguity.
true.	K1	therefore	implies	that	any	analytic	 judgement	will	be	know-
able a priori,	just	as	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	says.
Kant’s	 argument	 for	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	 is	more	 compli-
cated.	It	depends	on	K1	together	with	K2:
K2.	Apriority	entails	necessity.
Together	K1	and	K2	support	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity:	for	since	K1	
implies	that	analytic	statements	must	be	a priori	while	K2	implies	that	a 
priori	statements	must	be	necessary,	they	jointly	imply	that	all	analytic	
statements	must	be	necessary,	just	as	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	says.	
(Why	does	Kant	think	K2	is	true?	The	answer	doesn’t	really	matter	for	
my	 purposes,	 but	 Kant’s	 thought	was	 that	 judgements	 about	 neces-
sity	could	not	be	empirical	and	must	therefore	be	triggered	by	judge-
ments	about	apriority.	For	example,	he	writes:	"Experience	teaches	us,	
to	be	sure,	 that	something	is	constituted	thus	and	so,	but	not	 that	 it	
could	not	be	otherwise.	[Thus]	if	a	statement	is	thought	along	with	its	
necessity,	it	is	an	a priori judgment”	[1998,	B3].)
K1	 and	K2	 are	 substantive,	 non-trivial,	 synthetic	 doctrines	 about	
the	 relation	between	meaning,	 rationality	 and	possibility.	This	 is	 re-
vealed	by	the	fact	that	received	opinion	nowadays	is	that	they	are	false.	
Both	were	accepted	as	self-evidently	correct	by	philosophers	for	two	
centuries	after	the	Critique of Pure Reason’s	publication,	until	—	to	uni-
versal	 astonishment	—	Putnam	 (1973)	 demolished	 K1	 with	 his	 Twin	
Earth	thought	experiment	and	Kripke	(1980)	demolished	K2	with	his	
arguments in Naming and Necessity.	More	will	be	said	about	Putnam’s	
and	Kripke’s	 results	below.	For	now,	 the	 important	point	 is	 just	 that	
Kant,	innocent	as	he	was	of	Putnam’s	and	Kripke’s	ideas,	took	both	K1	
and	K2	to	be	true,	and	it	 is	for	this	reason	—	and	not	because	of	any	
trivializing	definitional	stipulation	on	his	part	—	that	he	endorsed	both	
Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	and	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity.
With	 this	point	 in	mind,	 let’s	 turn	 to	 the	question	as	 to	how	 the	
analyticity/syntheticity	distinction	should	be	framed.	It	is	traditionally	
framed	as	follows:
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All	analytical	 judgments	 rest	entirely	on	 the	 law	of	con-
tradiction….	 For	 since	 the	 predicate	 of	 an	 affirmative	
analytical	judgment	is	already	thought	beforehand	in	the	
concept	of	the	subject,	it	cannot	be	denied	of	that	subject	
without	contradiction.	(2004,	17)
And	so	it	appears	that	Kant	would	have	us	precisify	AnSyn5	as	follows:
AnSyn6:	A	statement	is	“analytic”	iff	its	being	actually	true	
is	deducible,	via	LNC,	from	its	wide	meaning	alone.	Oth-
erwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
However,	Kant	 is	being	a	 little	careless	here.	Suppose	p	 is	contradic-
tory.	 LNC	 allows	 us	 to	 infer,	 on	 this	 basis,	 that	 p	 is	 false.	 But	 LNC	
doesn’t	allow	us	to	get	from	the	falsity	of	p	to	the	conclusion	that	¬p is 
(analytically)	true.	This	step	instead	requires	the	use	of	another	funda-
mental law of thought — namely, the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM),	
the	principle	that	every	statement	is	either	true	or	false.	LEM	is	 just	
as	important	as	LNC	within	the	deduction	of	¬p.	Making	this	explicit	
brings	us	to	AnSyn7:
AnSyn7:	A	statement	is	“analytic”	iff	its	being	actually	true	
is	deducible,	via	LNC	and	LEM,	 from	 its	wide	meaning	
alone.	Otherwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
In	Kant’s	 time	both	LNC	and	LEM	were	uncontroversial.	Nowadays,	
however,	 LEM	 is	 denied	 by	 constructivists	 and	 LNC	 by	 paraconsis-
tentists,	 and	so	AnSyn7	 rests	on	assumptions	about	deductive	 logic	
that	are	vigorously	contested.	Fortunately,	we	can	frame	the	analytic/
synthetic	 distinction	 in	 a	 way	 which	 avoids	 these	 controversial	 as-
sumptions	about	the	foundational	principles	of	logic	by	simply	remain-
ing silent	as	to	which	principles	a	sound	deductive	logic	will	use	—	as	
follows:
AnSyn8:	A	statement	is	“analytic”	iff	its	being	actually	true	
kind	of	meaning	is	relevant	—	narrow	or	wide.	It	can	therefore	be	pre-
cisified	to	yield	either	AnSyn4	or	AnSyn5:
AnSyn4:	 A	 statement	 is	 "analytic”	 iff	 it	 is	 actually	 true	
in virtue of its narrow	 meaning	 alone.	 Otherwise	 it	 is	
“synthetic”.
AnSyn5:	A	statement	is	“analytic”	iff	it	is	actually	true	in	vir-
tue of its wide	meaning	alone.	Otherwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
According	to	AnSyn4,	the	kind	of	“meaning”	relevant	to	analyticity	is	
narrow	meaning,	which	just is the	kind	of	meaning	accessible	to	a pri-
ori reflection.	This	turns	analyticity	into	a	subspecies	of	apriority	as	a	
matter	of	definitional	stipulation,	making	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	
trivial.	Thus,	AnSyn4	is	(like	AnSyn3)	a	trivializing	definition.	If,	when	
Kant	framed	the	analytic/synthetic	distinction,	he	had	had	something	
like	AnSyn4	 in	mind,	 then	he	would	not	have	needed	 to	 rely	on	K1	
to	argue	 for	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	perfectly	clear	
that he can’t have	had	AnSyn4	in	mind,	since	the	idea	that	statements	
have	a	"narrow	meaning”	in	addition	to	their	wide	meaning	occurred	
to	philosophers	only	after	Kripke’s	and	Putnam’s	discoveries	(and	re-
mains	controversial	even	now).	It	would	be	anachronistic	to	attribute	
to	Kant	anything	similar	to	AnSyn4.	And	so,	if	we	are	to	respect	Kant’s	
usage	of	the	terms	‘analytic’	and	‘synthetic’,	we	should	choose	AnSyn5	
in	preference	to	AnSyn4.15
3.	AnSyn5	(like	AnSyn1	and	AnSyn2,	from	which	it	is	descended)	
speaks of a statement being true in virtue of meaning alone.	How	pre-
cisely	are	the	italicized	parts	of	this	statement	to	be	understood?	For	
Kant,	the	answer	is	that	a	statement	is	an	analytic	truth	if	it	can	be	logi-
cally	deduced	by	what	he	calls	the	‟Law	of	Contradiction”	—	this	being	
the	principle,	now	more	commonly	known	as	the	Law of Non-Contra-
diction	(LNC),	that all contradictions are false.	For	instance,	he	writes:
15. If the notion of ‟narrow	content”	 is	ultimately	 incoherent	 (Stalnaker,	 1989,	
1990,	2008;	Wilson,	1995),	then	this	provides	another,	even	quicker	reason	to	
opt	for	AnSyn5.	
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which	fundamental	laws	of	thought	are	sound,	it	yields	the	result	that	
(8)	is	analytic.	
The	problem	is	simply	that	this	classification	appears	incorrect.	The	
essential point here has been made many times down the ages — by 
Aristotle (Metaphysics,	IV,	4),	Leibniz	(1973,	93),	Carroll	(1895),	Frege	
(1964,	15)	and	Russell	(1912,	72),	among	others:	viz.,	logic	can’t	lift	itself	
by	its	own	bootstraps;	it	can’t	validate	its	own	foundational	principles	
except	on	pain	of	vicious	circularity.17	All	logical	analysis	presupposes	
certain	foundational	laws	of	thought,	such	as	LNC,	LEM	and	modus po-
nens,	and	these	are	therefore	not	themselves	susceptible	of	being	logi-
cally	proved.	Statements,	 like	(8),	that	assert	the	soundness	of	these	
laws	of	thought	are	hence	“pre-analytic”.	Their	truth	must	be	assumed	
before	we	can	even	begin	to	make	sense	of	there	being	such	things	as	
‟analytic	truths”	in	the	first	place.	Since	they	are	pre-analytic,	they	are	
not	analytic,	which	makes	them	synthetic.
If	further	evidence	is	wanted	for	thinking	(8)	should	be	classified	
as	synthetic,	 it	can	be	obtained	by	noticing	 that	 (8)	seems	to	fit	 the	
bill	perfectly	for	being	a	Kantian	a priori	synthetic	truth.	Is	(8)	know-
able a priori?	It	would	certainly	seem	so,	for	deductive	logic	is	a	source	
of a priori	knowledge	if	anything	is,	and	deductive	logic	assumes	the	
truth	of	(8).	(If	(8)	were	false,	then	deductive	logic	—	whether	classical,	
constructive	or	paraconsistent	—	could	not	be	trusted	to	yield	true	con-
clusions	from	true	premises.)	This	being	so,	(8)’s	status	as	an	a priori 
truth	must	be	at	least	as	secure	as	the	a priori	status	of	any	deductively	
proved	result	—	which	is	 to	say,	as	secure	as	could	ever	be.	But	how	
can	(8)	be	a priori,	given	it	cannot	be	logically	proved	without	begging	
the question? Kant held that a priori	 synthetic	 truths	 are	known	via	
a	 special	 kind	 of	 deduction	—	a	 transcendental deduction — that draws 
on	rational	 insights	into	the	limits	of	possible	experience	and	imagi-
nation.	According	to	Kant,	ϕ will be a priori	and	yet	synthetic	 if	ϕ is 
not	provable	by	logic	(i.	e.,	it	is	not	analytic)	but	if	the	rational	mind	
can	recognize	of	itself	that	it	is	incapable	of	coherently	perceiving	or	
17.	 For	a	more	recent	discussion,	see	(Boghossian, 1997, 339, 345–350).
is	deducible,	via	 sound	 logical	principles,	 from	 its	wide	
meaning	alone.	Otherwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
AnSyn8	has	the	virtue	of	letting	two	questions	be	separated.	The	first	
question	is	how	analyticity	should	be	defined.	AnSyn8	follows	Kant’s	
lead	by	defining	 analyticity	 in	 terms	of	what	 can	be	deduced	using	
sound	principles	of	 logic.	The	second	question	concerns	what	these	
“sound	principles	of	logic”	are.	AnSyn8	refers	to	such	principles	without	
specifying	their	identity.	There	is	therefore	room	for	classical	logicians,	
constructivists	 and	 paraconsistentists	 to	 agree	 in	 accepting	AnSyn8	
even	while	diverging	radically	in	their	answers	to	the	second	question.	
A	problem	remains.	Consider	(8):
(8)	 At	 least	 one	 of	 the	 following	 logical	 principles	 is	
sound:	LEM,	LNC	or	modus ponens.
(8)	makes	 an exceedingly modest	 claim	 about	 the	 foundations	 of	 log-
ic	—	a	 claim	so	modest	 it	will	be	accepted	not	only	by	 classical	 logi-
cians,	but	also	by	constructivists	and	paraconsistentists.	Constructiv-
ists	repudiate	LEM	and	paraconsistentists	repudiate	LNC,	but	it	would	
be	a	very	 rare	 logician	 indeed	who	would	repudiate	not	 just	one	of	
these	fundamental	laws	of	thought,	but	all	of	them,	for	a	“logic”	that	
endorsed	neither	LEM	nor	LNC	nor	modus	ponens	would	be	so	weak	
as	to	be	inferentially	useless.16	Because	all	reputable	logics	assume	at	
least	one	of	these	principles,	the	truth	of	(8)	is	trivially	provable	in	all	
such	logics,	by	simply	invoking	the	laws	themselves	—	the	very	laws	
whose	 truth	 is	 in	 question.	 Such	 a	 proof	 is	 obviously	worthless	 for	
persuasive	purposes,	since	it	presupposes	what	is	being	proved,	but	
AnSyn8	 doesn’t	 prohibit	 viciously	 circular	 deductions.	 For	 this	 rea-
son,	when	AnSyn8	is	combined	with	any	remotely	tenable	view	about	
16.	 In	the	unlikely	event	of	a	coherent	and	useful	new	logic	being	proposed	that	
disclaimed	LNC	and LEM	and modus ponens, my overall point would still stand, 
since	I	could	simply	further	weaken	(8)	by	adding	to	the	disjunction	a	prin-
ciple	that	the	new	logic	relies	on.
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laws	 that	 “it	 seems	to	me	an	attempt	 to	 jump	out	of	one’s	own	skin	
against	which	I	can	do	no	more	than	urgently	warn	them”	(1964,	15).
In	order	to	capture	the	idea	that	(8)	is	synthetic	rather	than	analytic,	
we	 need	merely	modify	 AnSyn8	 by	 including	 a	 prohibition	 against 
question-begging logical deductions.	The	result	is	AnSyn9:
AnSyn9:	A	statement	is	“analytic”	iff	its	being	actually	true	
is	deducible,	via	non-question-begging	use	of	sound	logi-
cal	principles,	from	its	wide	meaning	alone.	Otherwise	it	
is	“synthetic”.
AnSyn9	has	the	following	important	virtues:
1.	It	is	fully	consistent	with	the	traditional	formulation	of	
the	analytic/synthetic	distinction	—	namely,	AnSyn1	—	be-
cause	it	is	merely	a	disambiguated	version	of	AnSyn1.
2.	 For	 reasons	 just	 explained,	 it	 disambiguates	 AnSyn1	
in	 a	 way	 that	 appears	 to	 honor	 Kant’s	 linguistic	 inten-
tions.	 Since	 Kant	 both	 coined	 the	 analytic/synthetic	
distinction	 and	 made	 groundbreaking	 use	 of	 it	 in	 his	
own	hugely	 influential	philosophical	 system,	one	could	
break	usage	with	Kant	 and	use	 the	 terms	 ‘analytic’	 and	
‘synthetic’	 at	 cross-purposes	 to	 him	 only	 at	 the	 price	
of	 introducing	 unwonted	 muddle	 and	 confusion	 into	  
philosophical	language.
I	will	now	attempt	to	show	that	each	of	Recipe	1’s	raw	ingredients	
exists.	My	arguments	will	assume	that	AnSyn9	is	an	adequate	formu-
lation	of	the	analytic/synthetic	distinction.
4. Why NAS statements exist
Kant	reputedly	showed	long	ago	that	NAS	statements	(which	are	neces-
sary, a priori and	synthetic)	exist.	He	provided	many	examples,	includ-
ing	(4).	Matters	might	just	be	left	there.	But	some	of	Kant’s	examples	
conceiving	any	state	of	affairs	 that	would	 falsify	or	contradict	ϕ.	 (8)	
fulfills	this	condition.	We	find	that	the	rational	mind	can	only	coher-
ently	 imagine,	experience	and	conceive	 the	world	as	conforming	 to	
such	 laws	of	 thought	as	LNC,	LEM	and	modus ponens.	From	this	we	
draw	the	conclusion	that	the	world	we	cognize	and	experience	must	
itself	be	such	a	world	—	i.	e.,	a	world	where	(8)	is	true.	In	other	words,	
the	rational	mind	finds	itself	 imprisoned	in	certain	ways	of	thinking,	
imagining	 and	 experiencing,	 with	 logic	 being,	 so	 to	 speak,	 the	 sci-
ence	that	studies	the	bars	of	its	prison.	Any	world	that	a	rational	mind	
coherently	imagines	or	experiences	must,	for	this	reason,	be	a	world	
where	the	ways	of	thinking	that	logic	describes	hold	good,	which	is	to	
say,	a	world	where	(8)	is	true.	This	is	a	transcendental	deduction:	the	
rational	mind	shows	(8)	to	be	an	a priori	truth	by	reflecting	on	its	own	
inability	to	imagine	or	conceive	a	counterexample	to	(8).
This	idea	—	that	the	laws	of	thought	are	known	via	a	transcendental	
deduction	—	was	not	explicitly	defended	by	Kant,	but	was	defended	 
by	Schopenhauer:
It	is	by	means	of	a	kind	of	reflection	which	I	am	inclined	
to	call	Reason’s	self-examination,	that	we	know	that	[the	
laws	of	thought,	including	the	LNC	and	LEM]	express	the	
conditions	of	all	thinking,	and	therefore	have	these	con-
ditions	for	their	reason.	For,	by	the	fruitlessness	of	its	en-
deavors to think in opposition to these laws, our Reason 
acknowledges	 them	to	be	 the	conditions	of	all	possible	
thinking:	we	 then	find	out,	 that	 it	 is	 just	 as	 impossible	
to think in opposition to them, as it is to move the mem-
bers	 of	 our	 body	 in	 a	 contrary	 direction	 to	 their	 joints.	  
(1974,	128)
Frege	also	gestures	at	the	transcendental	nature	of	(8)	when,	after	not-
ing	that	the	laws	of	thought	cannot	be	proved	by	logic	without	circu-
larity, he writes of people who would question the soundness of these 
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described	by	deductive	logic,	and	so,	in	part,	by	(8).	As	Wittgenstein	
put it, ‟The	truth	is,	we	could	not	even	say of an ‘unlogical’ world how 
it	would	look”	(1922,	§3.031).	In	virtue	of	the	mind	having	these	imagi-
native	limits,	(8)	must	be	true,	not	just	in	the	world	we	experience,	but	
also	in	every	world	a	rational	mind	can	coherently	conceive	or	imag-
ine — making it not just actually true but also necessarily	true.
Finally,	is	(8)	analytic	or	synthetic?	We	saw	above	that	AnSyn9	im-
plies	it	 is	synthetic.	We	also	saw	that	there	are	various	powerful	rea-
sons	to	think	this	is	the	correct	classification.	Viz.,	(8)’s	truth	must	be	
assumed	before	we	can	make	sense	of	there	being	any	such	things	as	
analytic	truths	in	the	first	place,	from	which	it	follows	that	(8)	is	pre-
analytic	(and	thus	synthetic).	Moreover,	our	knowledge	that	(8)	is	true	
appears	to	have	a	transcendental	source,	just	as	would	be	expected	if	
it were Kantian a priori	synthetic	knowledge.	
In	short,	(8)	appears	to	be	necessary,	a priori	and	synthetic	—	mak-
ing	it	a	NAS	statement.	
5. Why NEA statements exist
For	an	example	of	an	NEA	statement,	we	need	look	no	further	than	(5):
(5)	Water	is	H
2
O.
That	(5)	is	empirical	is	obvious:	‘water’	is	a	name	for	the	transparent	
liquid	that	fills	the	lakes,	rivers	and	oceans	on	Earth.	This	substance	
might	conceivably	have	turned	out	to	be	something	other	than	H2O	
when	subjected	to	empirical,	scientific	analysis.
That	(5)	is	necessary	was	shown	by	Kripke.	‘Water’	is	a	rigid	desig-
nator:	it	refers,	in	every	possible	world,	to	whatever	substance	it	refers	
to	actually.	 ‘H
2
O’	is	likewise	a	rigid	designator:	it	refers	in	every	pos-
sible	world	to	samples	of	a	certain	type	of	molecule,	composed	of	one	
oxygen	atom	and	two	hydrogen	atoms.	Given	both	‘water’	and	‘H
2
O’	
are	 rigid	 designators,	 and	 given	 that,	 as	 an	 empirical	matter	 of	 fact,	
they actually	refer	to	the	same	substance,	it	follows	that	they	co-refer	
in	every	possible	world	—	i.	e.,	necessarily.
have	stood	the	test	of	time	poorly	(e.	g.,	his	claim	that	determinism	is	
a priori	and	necessary),	and	none	of	his	examples	is	uncontroversial.	
In	my	view,	(4)	is	a	plausible	example	of	a	NAS	statement.	On	the	
one	 hand,	 (4)’s	 denial	 (namely,	 ‘Causation	 doesn’t	 exist’)	 is	 pretty	
clearly	non-contradictory,	making	(4)	synthetic.	But	on	the	other	hand,	
it	also	seems	that	we	cannot	cognize	or	imagine	a	world	except	as	hav-
ing	a	causal	structure,	making	(4)	necessary	and	a priori.18
However,	although	(4)	arguably	makes	a	useful	“Exhibit	B”	for	the	
octopropositionalist,	a	compelling	“Exhibit	A”	is	still	wanted.	The	“Ex-
hibit	A”	I	have	in	mind	is	already	familiar	—	namely,	(8):
(8)	 At	 least	 one	 of	 the	 following	 logical	 principles	 is	
sound:	LEM,	LNC	or	modus ponens.
Is	(8)	a priori?	The	answer	is	affirmative,	for	reasons	explained	above.	
To	recap:	(8)’s	status	as	an	a priori	truth	must	be	at	least	as	secure	as	the	
a priori	status	of	any	deductively	proved	result	(i.	e.,	as	secure	as	could	
be),	since	deductive	logic	(whether	classical	or	non-classical)	assumes	
the	truth	of	(8).
Is	(8)	necessary?	(8)	could	fail	to	be	necessary	only	if	it	were	possible	
for	(8)	to	be	false,	but	deductive	logic	is	our	guide	when	we	judge	what	
is	possible	and	impossible,	and	(8)	makes	an	extraordinarily	modest	
claim	about	the	foundations	of	deductive	logic	itself.	In	attempting	to	
imagine	a	world	where	(8)	is	false,	we	would	be	attempting	to	imagine	
a world where deductive logic doesn’t work, and the idea of there being 
such	a	(logically)	possible	world	is	an	oxymoron.	We	cannot	imagine	
such	a	world,	because	our	imaginative	capabilities	have	limits	—	limits	
18.	 Why	necessary?	Because,	 in	Hume’s	words,	 “It	 is	 an	 established	maxim	 in	
metaphysics,	That	whatever	the	mind	clearly	conceives,	includes	the	idea	of	
possible	existence,	or	in	other	words,	that	nothing	we	imagine	is	absolutely	
impossible.	We	 can	 form	 the	 idea	of	 a	 golden	mountain,	 and	 from	 thence	
conclude	that	such	a	mountain	may	actually	exist.	We	can	form	no	idea	of	
a	mountain	without	a	valley,	and	therefore	regard	it	as	 impossible”	(Hume,	
2000,	§1.2.2).	In	short,	causation’s	existence	is	necessary	because	conceivabil-
ity	and	inconceivability	are	our	guide	to	possibility	and	impossibility	(Chalm-
ers,	2002)	and	because	we	can’t	conceive	of	its	non-existence.
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implies	that	‘Water	is	H
2
O’	is	analytic,	the	wide	meaning	of	‘water’	be-
ing	enough	to	determine	all	by	itself	that	‘Water	is	H
2
O’	is	actually	true	
(and, indeed, not only actually true, but necessarily	true).19
Chief	among	the	reasons	why	octopropositionalism	appears	prima 
facie	 implausible	 is	 because	most	 philosophers	 remember	 Kant’s	 fa-
mous	argument	against	the	existence	of	analytic	empirical	statements:	
viz.,	if	a	statement	is	true	in	virtue	of	meaning	alone,	then	a priori re-
flection	will	be	able	to	detect	that	this	is	the	case,	so	that	analyticity	
entails	apriority.	This	argument	withers	in	the	face	of	Putnam’s	dem-
onstration that ‟meanings	 ain’t	 in	 the	 head”	 (Rey,	 2016,	 §4.2).	 It	 as-
sumes	that	the	meanings	of	one’s	words,	and	their	truth-conditional	
import,	 are	accessible	 to	a priori	 rational	 reflection	 (K1,	 above).	The	
main	lesson	from	Twin	Earth	is	that	this	assumption	is	wrong.	Oscar	
and	Toscar	mean	different	things	when	they	say	“water”,	but	they	are	
psychologically	identical	and	so	the	facts	about	what	their	own	words	
mean	are	cognitively	inaccessible	to	them.	(If	Oscar	could	access	the	
full	truth-conditional	content	of	his	words	via	rational	reflection,	then	
(5)	would,	since	it	is	a	necessary	truth,	also	be	an	a priori	truth,	which	
it	obviously	isn’t.)
6. Why CAA statements exist
As	mentioned	 in	§1,	prospective	examples	of	CAA	statements	—	i.	e.,	
statements	 that	 are	 contingent,	 a priori	 and	 analytic	—	include	 both	
Kripke’s	(6)	and	Kaplan’s	(7):
(6)	 The	 Standard	 Meter	 Bar	 is	 one	 meter	 long,	 if	  
anything	is.
(7)	I	am	here	now.
19. More generally, any statement of the form R(D)=R(E) will be of type NEA, 
where:	(i)	D and E	are	a	pair	of	non-rigid	definite	descriptions	(like	‘the	morn-
ing	star’	and	‘the	evening	star’)	that,	as	an	empirically	discoverable	matter	of	
fact,	designate	the	same	thing	in	the	actual	world;	(ii)	R(x) rigidly designates 
whatever is actually	 designated	by	 the	definite	description,	x; and (iii) x=y 
returns at world w	iff	x and y designate the same thing in w.	
Finally,	 is	 (5)	analytic	or	synthetic?	AnSyn9	 implies	 that	 it	 is	ana-
lytic,	for	reasons	I	will	explain	by	reference	to	Putnam’s	‟Twin	Earth”	
thought	 experiment.	 It	 involves	 two	 people	—	Oscar,	 who	 inhabits	
Earth,	and	Toscar,	who	inhabits	another	planet,	Twin	Earth.	Both	use	
‘water’	to	rigidly	designate	the	substance	that	is	actually	the	dominant	
transparent	liquid	on	their	own	home	planet.	In	Oscar’s	case	this	liq-
uid	is	H
2
O.	In	Toscar’s	case	it	is	a	different	chemical	compound,	‘XYZ’,	
which	 is,	 however,	 superficially	 indistinguishable	 from	 H
2
O.	 Oscar	
and	 Toscar	 are	molecule-for-molecule	 doppelgängers	 of	 each	 other,	
and	hence	 indistinguishable	with	 regards	 to	 their	 internal	psycholo-
gies.	But	Putnam	points	out	that	their	psychological	similarity	doesn’t	
stop them meaning	 radically	 different	 things	 when	 they	 say,	 ‟Water	
is	H
2
O.”	Given	that	 ‘water’	 is	a	rigid	designator,	the	statement	Oscar	
makes	when	he	utters	this	sentence	is	a	necessary	truth,	extensionally	
and	truth-conditionally	equivalent	to	‘H
2
O	is	H
2
O’.	The	statement	Tos-
car	makes	is	instead	a	necessary	falsehood,	equivalent	to	‘XYZ	is	H
2
O’.	
Putnam	 infers,	on	 this	basis,	 that	 semantic	externalism	 is	 true	—	i.	e.,	
that “‘meanings’	just	ain’t	in	the	head!”	(1973,	704,	his	italics).	That	is,	
the	proposition	an	utterance	expresses	potentially	depends	not	only	
on	the	internal	psychology	of	the	person	who	makes	the	utterance,	but	
also	on	relevant	 facts	about	 the	surrounding	environment	—	such	as	
whether	the	local	watery	stuff	is	H
2
O,	or	XYZ.
As mentioned above, philosophers sometimes distinguish wide 
meaning from narrow.	Wide	meaning	is	the	kind	of	meaning	that	‟ain’t	
in	the	head”,	while	narrow	meaning	is	a	kind	of	meaning	that	is	in	the	
head.	On	this	way	of	telling	the	story,	when	Oscar	and	Toscar	each	say,	
“Water	is	H
2
O”,	their	words	have	different wide meanings while sharing 
the same	narrow	meaning.	We	may	put	the	point	by	saying	that	Oscar	
and	Toscar	make	different	statements	—	statements	truth-conditional-
ly	equivalent	to	‘Water	is	H
2
O’	and	‘Twater	is	H
2
O’	respectively	—	but	
that	these	two	statements	are	perfectly	alike	with	respect	to	their	cog-
nitively	accessible	‟narrow	content”.
Recall	that	according	to	AnSyn9	a	statement	is	analytic	if	its	being	
actually	true	is	deducible	from	its	wide meaning.	This	being	so,	AnSyn9	
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actually (if not necessarily) true by virtue of meaning (both its narrow 
meaning	and	its	wide	meaning)	alone.21 
The	octopropositionalist	needs	only	one	example	of	a	CAA	state-
ment,	but	in	(6)	and	(7)	she	has	two.22
7. Concluding remarks
My	arguments	of	§2	showed	octopropositionalism	must	be	true	if	NAS,	
CAA	and	NEA	statements	exist,	and	my	arguments	of	§4–6	showed	
that	each	of	these	three	types	of	propositions	does	indeed	exist.	My	
conclusion:	octopropositionalism	is	true.
In	order	to	reject	octopropositionalism,	one	must	either:	(i)	deny	
the	soundness	of	 the	trumping	rules	described	in	§2;	or	(ii)	deny	of	
both	(4)	and	(8)	 that	 they	are	NAS	statements;	or	(iii)	deny	that	(5)	
is	 an	NEA	statement;	or	 (iv)	deny	of	both	 (6)	 and	 (7)	 that	 they	are	
CAA	statements.	Option	 (i)	 appears	hopeless.	Options	 (ii),	 (iii)	 and	
(iv)	would	almost	certainly	involve	denying	that	AnSyn9	adequately	
characterizes	the	analytic/synthetic	distinction.	But	on	what	grounds	
might	AnSyn9	be	challenged?	Not	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	inconsis-
tent	with	the	traditional	formulation	of	the	analytic/synthetic	distinc-
tion	—	namely,	AnSyn1	—	because	AnSyn9	is	obtained	from	AnSyn1	by	
disambiguation.	Nor	on	the	grounds	that	in	disambiguating	AnSyn1	I	
have	 failed	to	respect	historical	usage,	because	 in	deriving	AnySyn9	
from	AnSyn1	I	have	used	Kant	as	my	guide,	and	Kant	is	the	canonical	
historical	source.	
In	arguing	for	octopropositionalism	I	have	relied	on	the	idea	that	
21.	 Kripke	(1980,	122n)	himself	acknowledges	that	a priori	contingencies	like	(6)	
might	be	counted	as	analytic.
22. More generally, any statement of the form F(D)∨(R(D)=D) will be of type 
CAA,	where:	(i)	D	is	some	non-rigid	definite	description	that	picks	out	its	ref-
erent	by	describing	an	accidental	property	of	the	referent	(like	‘the	inventor	
of	bifocals’);	(ii)	F(D)	returns	TRUE	at	world	w	iff	D fails to designate anything 
in w; (iii) R(D) rigidly designates whatever is actually designated by D; and 
(iv) x=y	returns	TRUE	at	world	w	 iff	x and y designate the same thing in w.	
Similar	examples	of	CAA	statements	can	be	manufactured	on	the	model	of	
‘It	is	raining	if	it	is	actually	raining’	(as	pointed	out	to	me	by	an	anonymous	
reviewer).
There	are	very	strong	grounds	for	thinking	both	(6)	and	(7)	are	CAA	
statements.	The	case	for	holding	(7)	to	be	a	CAA	statement	—	as	articu-
lated	by	Kaplan	(1977)	and	G.	Russell	(2008)	—	is	straightforward.	(7)	
is	contingent	because	although	it	is	actually true that I am here now, 
counterfactually	I	might	not	have	been:	I	could	have	been	somewhere	
else	now,	 instead.	 (7)	 is	a priori	because	mere	rational	 reflection	suf-
fices	 to	establish	 that	 ‘I	am	here	now’	 is	 (actually)	 true,	and	no	pos-
sible	experience	could	disconfirm	this	claim.20	Finally,	(7)	is	analytic	
because	 the	meanings	 (both	wide	 and	narrow)	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘I’,	 ‘am’,	
‘here’	 and	 ‘now’	 suffice	 by	 themselves	 to	 determine	 that	 (7)	 is	 actu-
ally (albeit not necessarily)	true.	(The	definition	of	‘here’	is	such	that	in	
my	mouth	it	rigidly	designates	the	spatial	location	where	I	actually am 
now,	so	that	 in	the	actual	world,	 if	not	 in	other	possible	worlds,	the	
expressions	‘here’	and	‘where	I	am	now’	must	co-refer.)
Next,	(6).	Let’s	make	it	a	matter	of	definitional	stipulation	that	‘one	
meter’	is	a	rigid	designator	that	denotes	the	actual	length	of	the	Stan-
dard	Meter	Bar.	With	this	stipulation	in	place,	it	is	clear	that	(6)	is	con-
tingent.	There	are,	for	example,	possible	worlds	wherein	the	Standard	
Meter	Bar	is,	say,	twice as long as	it	is	in	the	actual	world,	which	is	to	
say, two meters	long.	(6)	will	be	false	in	such	counterfactual	worlds	de-
spite	being	true	in	the	actual	world.	That	(6)	is	a priori	is	also	obvious.	
Mere	consideration	of	the	foregoing	definition	of	‘one	meter’	suffices	
to	 establish	 that	 if	 the	 Standard	Meter	 Bar	 exists,	 then	 it	 is	actually 
(if	perhaps	not	counterfactually)	one	meter	long,	and	thus	that	(6)	is	
actually	(if	not	always	counterfactually)	true.	(One	needn’t	empirically	
measure	the	length	of	the	actual	Bar	to	determine	its	length	in	meters,	
the	Bar’s	length	being	itself	the	ultimate	arbiter	and	reference	point	for	
all	such	measurements.)	Finally,	AnSyn9	 implies	 that	(6)	 is	analytic:	
for	given	that	we	can	deduce	that	(6)	is	actually	true	by	merely	con-
templating	the	above	definition	of	‘one	meter’,	it	is	obvious	that	(6)	is	
20.	This	assumes	that	Descartes	was	right	and	that	one	can	know	a priori that the 
‘I’	 exists.	 If	Descartes	was	wrong	—	i.	e.,	 if	one	can	know	only	via	empirical	
introspection	that	the	‘I’	exists	—	then	(7)’s	status	as	a	CAA	statement	can	be	
preserved	by	adding	a	reference-failure	clause,	as	follows:	‘Either	I	don’t	exist,	
or	I	am	here	now’.
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have	shown	that	Recipe	1	can	be	used	to	construct	logically compound 
statements belonging in the NAA, NES, CAS, CEA and CES	categories.	
Which	of	these	categories	can	also	be	filled	with	atomic statements (not 
manufactured	 using	 the	 trumping	 rules)?23	 Third,	 octopropositional-
ism	implies	that	metaphysical,	epistemic	and	semantic	entailment	are	
not	reliable	guides	to	each	other	(as	explained	in	§1).	For	any	two	of	
these	three	kinds	of	entailment,	what	are	the	precise	conditions	under	
which	one	can	come	apart	from	the	other?	Fourth,	the	dichotomy	be-
tween truths that are knowable a priori and knowable empirically	can	be	
turned	into	a	trichotomy	by	also	recognizing	truths	that	are	unknow-
able	 (a	plausible	example	being	Goldbach’s	conjecture).24 This gives 
rise	 to	 twelve	modal	categories,	 rather	 than	the	eight.	Do	all	 twelve	
have members?25	 Fifth,	 G.	 Russell	 (2008,	 56)	 and	 Juhl	 and	 Loomis	
(2010,	219)	have	recently	proposed	rival	ways	of	construing	the	analyt-
ic/synthetic	distinction.	What	are	the	relative	virtues	and	dis-virtues	of	
their	proposals	as	compared	with	AnSyn9?	
These	questions	are	topics	for	future	work.26
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Kripke	and	Putnam’s	discoveries	show	—	contrary	to	what	Kant	imag-
ined	 possible	—	that	 analytic	 statements	 can	 be	 empirical	 (i.	e.,	 that	
Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	is	false)	and	contingent	(i.	e.,	that	Analyti-
city	Entails	Necessity	is	false).	An	opponent	of	octopropositionalism	
might	be	tempted	to	insist	that	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority	and	Ana-
lyticity	Entails	Necessity	are	not	up	for	negotiation,	and	to	deal	with	
purported	 Kripkean	 and	 Putnamian	 counterexamples	 to	 Analyticity	
Entails	Apriority	and	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	 (e.	g.,	 (5)	and	(6))	
by adopting a trivializing	construal	of	the	analytic/synthetic	distinction,	
like	AnSyn3	and/or	AnSyn4.	To	borrow	a	line	from	Bertrand	Russell	
(1919,	 72),	 this	 is	 an	 approach	with	 ‟many advantages; they are the 
same	as	the	advantages	of	theft	over	honest	toil”.	If	one	redefines	ana-
lyticity	to	make	it	a	matter	of	brute	definitional	stipulation	that	no	“an-
alytic”	statement	can	be	contingent	or	empirical,	then,	of	course,	one	
gets	 the	 result	 that	 Analyticity	 Entails	 Apriority	 and	 Analyticity	 En-
tails	Necessity	are	true	and	that	octopropositionalism	(so	conceived)	
is	false.	By	the	same	token,	ornithologists	might	have	saved	the	theory	
that	all	swans	are	white	when	they	met	their	first	black	swan	by	rede-
fining	‘swan’	to	mean	what	was	formerly	meant	by	‘white	swan’.	Surely,	
we	 should	 register	 Kripke’s	 and	 Putnam’s	 groundbreaking	 discover-
ies	 about	possibility	 and	meaning	by	 saying	 that	Analyticity	Entails	
Apriority	and	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	have	turned	out	to	be	false, 
not	by	moving	the	goalposts	and	redefining	‘analyticity’	to	make	Ana-
lyticity	Entails	Apriority	and	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	come	out	as	
trivially	true.	If	we	are	to	avoid	mutilating	the	meanings	of	the	terms	
‘analytic’	and	‘synthetic’	and	introducing	unwonted	equivocations	into	
the	language,	then	we	must	respect	Kant’s	usage.	And	as	discussed	in	
§3,	it	appears	clear	that	for	Kant	it	was not	a	matter	of	brute	definitional	
stipulation	 that	 all	 analytic	 statements	must	be	a priori, or that they 
must	be	necessary.	
My	arguments	in	this	paper	raise	several	questions.	First,	epistemic	
two-dimensional	 semantics	provides	a	unified	explanation	of	neces-
sity	and	apriority	(	Chalmers,	2004).	Can	it	be	merged	with	AnSyn9	
to	yield	a	unified	explanation	of	all three	modal	distinctions?	Second,	I	
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